Abstract. This paper presents a secure constant-round password-based group key exchange protocol in the common reference string model. Our protocol is based on the group key exchange protocol by Burmester and Desmedt and on the 2-party password-based authenticated protocols by Gennaro and Lindell, and by Katz, Ostrovsky, and Yung. The proof of security is in the standard model and based on the notion of smooth projective hash functions. As a result, it can be instantiated under various computational assumptions, such as decisional Diffie-Hellman, quadratic residuosity, and N -residuosity.
and certificates. One way to avoid such infrastructures is to use passwords for authentication. In the latter case, the pool of players who wants to agree on a common secret key only needs to share a low-entropy password -a 4-digit pin-code, for example-against which an exhaustive search is quite easy to perform. In password-based protocols, it is clear that an outsider attacker can always guess a password and attempt to run the protocol. In case of failure, he can try again with a different guess. After each failure, the adversary can erase one password. Such an attack, known as "on-line exhaustive search" cannot be avoided, but the damage it may cause can be mitigated by other means such as limiting the number of failed login attempts. A more dangerous threat is the "off-line exhaustive search", also known as "dictionary attack". It would mean that after one failure, or even after a simple eavesdropping, the adversary can significantly reduce the number of password candidates.
In the two-party case, perhaps the most well known Diffie-Hellman variant is the encrypted key exchange protocol by Bellovin and Merritt [7] . However, its security analyses [3, 9, 12, 13 ] require ideal models, such as the random oracle model [4] or the ideal cipher model. The first practical passwordbased key exchange protocol, without random oracles, was proposed by Katz et al. [27] in the common reference string model and it is based on the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem [18] . Their work was later extended by Gennaro and Lindell [23] using the more general smooth projective hash function primitive [18, 19, 20] .
In the group key exchange case, very few protocols have been proposed with password authentication. In [11, 14] , Bresson et al. showed how to adapt their group Diffie-Hellman protocols to the password-based scenario. However, as the original protocols on which they are based, their security analyses require ideal models and the total number of rounds is linear in the number of players, making their schemes impractical for large groups. More recently, several constant-round password-based group key exchange protocols have been proposed in the literature by Abdalla et al. [1] , by Dutta and Barua [22] , and by Kim, Lee, and Lee [30] . All of these constructions are based on the Burmester and Desmedt protocol [16, 17] and are quite efficient, but their security analyses usually require the random oracle and/or the ideal cipher models. 1 Independently and concurrently to our work, a new constant-round password-based group key exchange protocol has been proposed by Bohli et al. [8] . Their protocol is more efficient than ours and also enjoys a security proof in the standard model.
Contributions.
In this paper, we propose the first password-based authenticated group key exchange protocol in the standard model. To achieve this goal, we extend the Gennaro-Lindell framework [23] to the group setting, using ideas similar to those used in the Burmester-Desmedt protocol [16, 17] . In doing so, we take advantage of the smooth projective hash function primitive [19] to avoid the use of ideal models. Our protocol has several advantages. First, it is efficient both in terms of communication, only requiring 5 rounds, and in terms of computation, with a per-user computational load that is linear in the size of the group. Second, like the Burmester-Desmedt protocol, our protocol is also contributory since each member contributes equally to the generation of the common session key. Such property, as pointed out by Steiner, Tsudik and Waidner [32] , may be essential for certain distributed applications. Finally, as in the Gennaro-Lindell framework [23] , our protocol works in the common reference string model and is quite general, being built in a modular way from four cryptographic primitives: a LPKE-IND-CCA-secure labeled encryption scheme, a signature scheme, a family of smooth projective hash functions, and a family of universal hash functions. Thus, it can be instantiated under various computational assumptions, such as decisional Diffie-Hellman, quadratic residuosity, and N -residuosity (see [23] ). In particular, the Diffie-Hellman variant (based on the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem [18] ) can be seen as a generalization of the KOY protocol [27] to the group setting.
Security Model
The security model for password-based group key exchange protocols that we present here is the one by Bresson et al. [14] , which is based on the model by Bellare et al. [3] for 2-party password-based key exchange protocols.
Protocol participants. Let U denote the set of potential participants in a password-based group key exchange protocol. Each participant U ∈ U may belong to several subgroups G ⊆ U, each of which has a unique password pw G associated to it. The password pw G of a subgroup G is known to all the users U i ∈ G.
Protocol execution. The interaction between an adversary A and the protocol participants only occurs via oracle queries, which model the adversary capabilities in a real attack. During the execution of the protocol, the adversary may create several instances of a participant and several instances of the same participant may be active at any given time. Let U i denote the instance i of a participant U and let b be a bit chosen uniformly at random. The query types available to the adversary are as follows:
• Execute(U Partnering. Following [29] , we define the notion of partnering via session and partner identifiers. Let the session identifier sid i of a participant instance U i be a function of all the messages sent and received by U i as specified by the group key exchange protocol. Let the partner identifier pid i of a participant instance U i is the set of all participants with whom U i wishes to establish a common secret key. Two instances U 
Freshness. Differently from [29] , our definition of freshness does not take into account forward security as the latter is out of the scope of the present paper. Let acc i be true if an instance U i goes into an accept state after receiving the last expected protocol message and false otherwise. We say that an instance U i is fresh if acc i = true and no Reveal has been asked to U i or to any of its partners.
Correctness. For a protocol to be correct, it should always be the case that, whenever two instances U are partnered and have accepted, both instances should hold the same non-null session key.
Indistinguishability. Consider an execution of the group key exchange protocol P by an adversary A, in which the latter is given access to the Reveal, Execute, Send, and Test oracles and asks a single Test query to a fresh instance, and outputs a guess bit b ′ . Let Succ denote the event b ′ correctly matches the value of the hidden bit b used by the Test oracle. The AKE-IND advantage of an adversary A in violating the indistinguishability of the protocol P and the advantage function of the protocol P , when passwords are drawn from a dictionary D, are respectively Adv
(A)} , where maximum is over all A with time-complexity at most t and using resources at most R (such as the number of queries to its oracles). The definition of time-complexity that we use henceforth is the usual one, which includes the maximum of all execution times in the experiments defining the security plus the code size.
We say that a password-based group key exchange protocol P is secure if the advantage of any polynomial-time adversary is only negligibly larger than O(q/|D|), where q is number of different protocol instances to which the adversary has asked Send queries. Given that the dictionary size can be quite small in practice, the hidden constant in the big-O notation should be as small as possible (preferably 1) for a higher level of security.
Building blocks

Universal Hash Function Families
One of the tools used in our protocol is a family of universal hash functions. A family UH of universal hash function is a map K × G → R, where K is the key or seed space, G is the domain of the hash function, and R is the range. For each seed or key k ∈ K, we can define a particular instance UH k : G → R of the family by fixing the key being used in the computation of the function. For simplicity, we sometimes omit the seed k from the notation when referring to a particular instance of the family. Let UH k be a universal hash function chosen at random from a family UH . One of the properties of universal hash function families in which we are interested is the one that says that, if an element g is chosen uniformly at random from G, then the output distribution of UH k (g) is statistically close to uniform in R [25] .
Signatures
The signature scheme used in our protocol is the standard one introduced by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rivest [24] . A standard signature scheme SIG = (SKG, Sign, Ver) is composed of three algorithms. The key generation algorithm SKG takes as input 1 k , where k is a security parameter, and returns a pair (sk , vk ) containing the secret signing key and the public verification key. The signing algorithm Sign takes as input the secret key sk and a message m and returns a signature σ for that message. The verification algorithm Ver on input (vk , m, σ) returns 1 if σ is a valid signature for the message m with respect to the verification key vk .
The security notion for signature schemes needed in our proofs is strong existential unforgeability under chosen-message attacks [24] . More precisely, let (sk , vk ) be a pair of secret and public keys for a signature scheme SIG, let Sign(·) be a signing oracle which returns σ = Sign(sk , m) on input m, and let F be an adversary. Then, consider the experiment in which the adversary F, who is given access to the public key vk and to the signing oracle Sign(·), outputs a pair (m, σ). Let {(m i , σ i )} denote the set of queries made to the signing oracle with the respective responses and let Succ denote the event in which Ver(vk , m ′ , σ ′ ) = 1 and that (m ′ , σ ′ ) ∈ {(m i , σ i )}. The SIG-SUF-CMA-advantage of an adversary F in violating the chosen message security of the signature scheme SIG is defined as Adv
. A signature scheme SIG is said to be SIG-SUF-CMA-secure if this advantage is a negligible function in k for all polynomial time adversaries (PTAs) F asking a polynomial number of queries to their signing oracle.
Labeled Encryption
The notion of labeled encryption, first formalized in the ISO 18033-2 standard [31] , is a variation of the usual encryption notion that takes into account the presence of labels in the encryption and decryption algorithms. More precisely, in a labeled encryption scheme, both the encryption and decryption algorithms have an additional input parameter, referred to as a label, and the decryption algorithm should only correctly decrypt a ciphertext if its input label matches the label used to create that ciphertext.
Formally, a labeled encryption scheme LPKE = (LKG, Enc, Dec) consists of three algorithms. Via (pk , sk ) $ ← LKG(1 k ), where k ∈ N is a security parameter, the randomized key-generation algorithm produces the public and secret keys of the scheme. Via c $ ← Enc(pk , l, m; r ), the randomized encryption algorithm produces a ciphertext c for a label l and message m using r as the randomness. Via m ← Dec(sk , l, c), the decryption algorithm decrypts the ciphertext c using l as the label to get back a message m.
The security notion for labeled encryption is similar to that of standard encryption schemes. The main difference is that, whenever the adversary wishes to ask a query to his Left-or-Right encryption oracle, in addition to providing a pair of messages (m 0 , m 1 ), he also has to provide a target label l in order to obtain the challenge ciphertext c. Moreover, when chosen-ciphertext security (LPKE-IND-CCA) is concerned, the adversary is also allowed to query his decryption oracle on any pair (l, c) as long as the ciphertext c does not match the output of a query to his Left-or-Right encryption oracle whose input includes the label l. Formally, let LPKE = (LKG, Enc, Dec) be a labeled encryption scheme. To any bit b ∈ {0, 1} and any adversary D, we associate the experiment:
The LPKE-IND-CCA-advantage of an adversary D in violating the chosen-ciphertext indistinguishability of LPKE is defined as
A LPKE scheme LPKE is said to be LPKE-IND-CCA-secure if this advantage is a negligible function in k for all PTAs D. As shown by Bellare et al. in the case of standard encryption schemes [2] , one can easily show that the Left-or-Right security notion for labeled encryption follows from the more standard Find-Then-Guess security notion (in which the adversary is only allowed a single query to his challenging encryption oracle).
Smooth Projective Hash Functions
The notion of projective hash function families was first introduced by Cramer and Shoup [19] as a means to design chosen-ciphertext secure encryption schemes. Later, Gennaro and Lindell [23] showed how to use such families to build secure password-based authenticated key exchange protocols. One of the properties that makes these functions particularly interesting is that, for certain points of their domain, their values can be computed by using either a secret hashing key or a public projective key. While the computation using secret hashing key works for all the points in the domain of the hash function, the computation using a public projective key only works for a specified subset of the domain. A projective hash function family is said to be smooth if the value of the function on inputs that are outside the particular subset of the domain are independent of the projective key. In [23] , the notion of smooth hash functions was presented in the context of families of hard (partitioned) subset membership problems. Here we follow the same approach.
Hard partitioned subset membership problems. Let k ∈ N be a security parameter. In a family of hard (partitioned) subset membership problem, we first specify two sets X(k) and
respectively. Next, we specify a witness set W(k) ⊆ {0, 1} poly(k) and a NP-relation R(k) ⊆ X(k) × W(k) such that x ∈ L(k) if and only if there exists a witness w ∈ W(k) such that (x , w ) ∈ R(k). Then, we say that a family of subset membership problems is hard
instances can be efficiently generated, that a member element x ∈ L(k) can be efficiently sampled according to D(L(k)) along with a witness w ∈ W(k) to the fact that (x , w ) ∈ R(k), that non-member elements x ∈ X(k)\L(k) can be efficiently sampled according to D(X(k)\L(k)), and that the distributions of member and non-member elements cannot be efficiently distinguished. The definition of hard partitioned subset membership problem is an extension of the one given above in which the set X(k) is partitioned in disjoint subsets X(k, i) for some index i ∈ {1, . . . , l} and for which for all i it remains hard to distinguish an element
Hard partitioned subset membership problems from labeled encryption. The families of hard partitioned subset membership problems in which we are interested are those based on LPKE-IND-CCA-secure labeled encryption schemes. More precisely, let LPKE = (LKG, Enc, Dec)
be a LPKE-IND-CCA-secure labeled encryption scheme and let pk be a public key outputted by the LKG algorithm for a given security parameter k. Let Enc(pk ) denote an efficiently recognizable superset of the space of all ciphertexts that may be outputted by the encryption algorithm Enc when the public key is pk and let L and M denote efficiently recognizable supersets of the label and message spaces. Using these sets, we can define a family of hard partitioned subset membership problems as follows. First, we define the sets X and L for the family of hard subset membership problems as
Next, we define the partitioning of the sets X and L with respect to the message and label used in the encryption as X(pk , l, m) = Enc(pk ) × l × m and L(pk , l, m) = {(c, l, m) | ∃r s.t. c = Enc(pk , l, m; r )}. The distribution D(L(pk , l, m)) can then be defined by choosing a random r ∈ R and outputting the triple (Enc(pk , l, m; r ), l, m) with r as a witness. Likewise, the distribution D(X(pk , l, m) \ L(pk , l, m)) can be defined by choosing a random r ∈ R and outputting the triple (Enc(pk , l, m ′ ; r ), l, m), where m ′ is a dummy message different from m but of the same length. Finally, we define the witness set W(pk ) to be r and the NP-relation R(pk ) in a natural way. It is easy to see that the hardness of distinguishing non-members from members follows from the LPKE-IND-CCA security of the labeled encryption scheme.
Smooth projective hash functions.
) be a family of hard (partitioned) subset membership problems based on a LPKE-IND-CCA-secure labeled encryption scheme LPKE with security parameter k. A family of smooth projective hash functions HASH (pk ) = (HashKG, ProjKG, Hash, ProjHash) associated with HLPKE consists of four algorithms. Via hk $ ← HashKG(pk ), the randomized key-generation algorithm produces hash keys hk ∈ HK(pk ), where k ∈ N is a security parameter and pk is the public key of a labeled encryption scheme LPKE. Via phk $ ← ProjKG(hk , l, c), the randomized key projection algorithm produces projected hash keys phk ∈ PHK(pk ) for a hash key hk with respect to label l and ciphertext c. Via g ← Hash(hk , c, l, m), the hashing algorithm computes the hash value g ∈ G(pk ) of (c, l, m) using the hash key hk . Via g ← ProjHash(phk , c, l, m; r ), the projected hashing algorithm computes the hash value g ∈ G(pk ) of (c, l, m) using the projected hash key phk and a witness r to the fact that c is a valid encryption of message m with respect to the public-key pk and label l.
Properties. The properties of smooth projective hash functions in which we are interested are correctness, smoothness, and pseudorandomness.
Correctness. Let LPKE be a labeled encryption scheme and let pk be a public key outputted by the LKG algorithm for a given security parameter k. Let c = Enc(pk , l, m; r ) be the ciphertext for a message m with respect to public key pk and label l computed using r as the randomness. Then, for any hash key hk ∈ HK(pk ) and projected hash key phk $ ← ProjKG(hk , l, c), the values Hash(hk , c, l, m) and ProjHash(phk , c, l, m, r ) are the same.
Smoothness. Let hk ∈ HK(pk ) be a hash key and let phk ∈ PHK(pk ) be a projected hash key for hk with respect to l and c. Then, for every triple (c, l, m) for which c is not a valid encryption of message m with respect to the public-key pk and label l (i.e., (c, l, m) ∈ X(pk , l, m) \ L(pk , l, m)), the hash value g = Hash(hk , c, l, m) is statistically close to uniform in G and independent of the values (phk , c, l, m).
Pseudorandomness. Let LPKE be a LPKE-IND-CCA-secure labeled encryption scheme, let pk be a public key outputted by the LKG algorithm for a given security parameter k, and let (l, m) ∈ L × M be a message-label pair. Then, for uniformly chosen hash key hk ∈ HK(pk ) and randomness r ∈ R(pk ), the distributions {c = Enc(pk , l, m; r ), l, m, phk
More formally, let LPKE = (LKG, Enc, Dec) be a LPKE-IND-CCA-secure labeled encryption scheme, pk be a public key outputted by the LKG algorithm for a given security parameter k, and let 
Then, for every (non-uniform) PTAs D, the advantage Adv
Examples. To provide the reader with an idea of how efficient smooth projective hash functions are, we recall here the example given in [23] based on the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [18] .
The labeled version of the Cramer-Shoup scheme works as follows. Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q where q is large. The key generation algorithm chooses two additional random generators g 1 , g 2 in G, a universal one-way hash function H, and random values z,z 1 ,z 2 ,ẑ 1 ,ẑ 2 in Z q with z = 0. The secret key is set to (z,z 1 ,z 2 ,ẑ 1 ,ẑ 2 ) and the public key is defined to be (h,h,ĥ, g 1 , g 2 , H), where
To encrypt a message m ∈ G with respect to label l, the sender chooses r ∈ Z q , and computes
To decrypt a ciphertext c = (u 1 , u 2 , e, v) with respect to label l, the receiver computes θ = H(l, u 1 , u 2 , e) and tests if v equals uz
. If equality does not hold, it outputs ⊥; otherwise, it outputs m = eu −z 1 . The smooth projective hashing for the labeled Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme is then defined as follows. The hash key generation algorithm HashKG simply sets the key hk to be the tuple (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 ) where each a i is a random value in Z q . The key projection function ProjKG, on input (hk , l, c), first computes θ = H(l, u 1 , u 2 , e) and outputs phk = g
2 (e/m) a 3 v a 4 . The projective hash function ProjHash on input (phk , c, l, m, r ) simply outputs phk r .
A scalable password-based group key exchange protocol
In this section, we finally present our password-based group key exchange protocol. Our protocol is an extension of the Gennaro-Lindell password-based key exchange protocol [23] to the group setting and uses ideas similar to those used in the Burmester-Desmedt group key exchange protocol [17] . The Gennaro-Lindell protocol itself is an abstraction of the password-based key exchange protocol of Katz, Ostrovsky, and Yung [27, 28] . Like the Gennaro-Lindell protocol, our protocol is built in a modular way from four cryptographic primitives: a LPKE-IND-CCA-secure labeled encryption scheme, a signature scheme, a family of smooth projective hash functions, and a family of universal hash functions. Thus, our protocol enjoys efficient instantiations based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman, quadratic residuosity, and N -residuosity assumptions (see [23] ). Like the Burmester-Desmedt group key exchange protocol, our protocol only requires a constant number of rounds and low per-user computation.
As done in the Gennaro-Lindell protocol, we also assume the existence of a mechanism to allow parties involved in the protocol to differentiate between concurrent executions as well as identify the other parties with which they are interacting. As in their case, this requirement is only needed for the correct operation of the protocol. No security requirement is imposed on this mechanism.
Protocol Description
Overview. As in the Burmester-Desmedt protocol, our protocol assumes a ring structure for the users so that we can refer to the predecessor and successor of a user. Moreover, we associate each user with an index i between 1 and n, where n is the size of the group. After deciding on the order of the users, our protocol works as follows. First, each user in the group executes two correlated instances of the Gennaro-Lindell protocol, one with his predecessor and one with his successor so each user can authenticate his neighbors (this accounts for the first 3 rounds of the protocol). However, instead of generating a single session key in each of these instances, we modify the original Gennaro-Lindell protocol so that two independent session keys are generated in each session (this requires an extra hash key and an extra projection key per user). We then use the first one of these as a test key to authenticate the neighbor with whom that key is shared and we use the other one to help in the computation of the group session key, which is defined as the product of these latter keys. To do so, we add one more round of communication like in the Burmester-Desmedt protocol, so that each user computes and broadcasts the ratio of the session keys that he shares with his predecessor and successor. After this round, each user is capable of computing the group session key. However, to ensure that all users agree on the same key, a final round of signatures is added to the protocol to make sure that all users compute the group session key based on the same transcript. The key used to verify the signature of a user is the same one transmitted by that user in the first round of the Gennaro-Lindell protocol.
For a pictorial description of the our protocol, please refer to Fig. 1 . The formal description follows.
Description. Let LPKE = (LKG, Enc, Dec) be a labeled encryption scheme, let SIG = (SKG, Sign, Ver) be a signature scheme, and let HASH (pk ) = (HashKG, ProjKG, Hash, ProjHash) be a family smooth projective hash functions based on LPKE. Let UH : G → {0, 1} 2l and UH ′ : G → {0, 1} l be two universal hash functions chosen uniformly at random from the families UH and UH ′ and let UH 1 (g) and UH 2 (g) refer to the first and second halves of UH(g). Let U 1 , . . . , U n be the users wishing to establish a common secret key and let pw be their joint password chosen uniformly at random from a dictionary Dict of size N . We assume pw either lies in the message space M of LPKE or can be easily mapped to it. Our protocol has a total of five rounds of communication and works as follows.
Initialization. A trusted server runs the key generation algorithm LKG on input 1 k , where k ∈ N is a security parameter, to obtain a pair (pk , sk ) of secret and public keys and publishes the public key pk along with randomly selected universal hash function UH and UH ′ from the families UH and UH ′ .
Round 1. In this first round, each player U i for i = 1, . . . , n starts by setting the partner identifier pid i to {U 1 , . . . , U n }. Then, each player U i generates a pair (sk i , vk i ) of secret and public keys for a signature scheme and a label l i = vk i U 1 . . . U n . Next, each player encrypts the joint group password pw using the encryption algorithm Enc with respect to the public key pk and label l i using r R i as the randomness. Let c R i denote the resulting ciphertext (i.e., c R i = Enc(pk , l i , pw; r R i )). At the end of this round, each player U i broadcasts the pair (l i , c R i ).
Round 2. In this second round, each player U i for i = 1, . . . , n encrypts once more the joint group password pw using the encryption algorithm Enc with respect to the public key pk and label l i using 
Here and in other parts of the protocol, the indices are taken modulo n. At the end of this round, each player
Round 3. In this round, player U i first chooses two new hash keys hk i and hk R i uniformly at random from HK(pk ) for the smooth projective hash function. Next, player U i generates two projection keys phk i and phk 
and the witness r R i to the fact that c R i is a valid encryption of pw with respect to pk and l i . Finally, player U i computes a test key
, and computes a signature σ R i on T R i using sk i . At the end of this round, player U i broadcasts the tuple (phk i , phk 
for its predecessor and an auxiliary key
. More precisely, player U i computes the value K i using the hash key hk i and the value K i−1 using the projection key phk i−1 along with the witness r L i to the fact that c L i is a valid encryption of pw with respect to pk and l i . Finally, each player U i broadcasts the pair (X i , test L i ).
Round 5. First, each player U i checks whether test L i+1 = UH 2 (X R i ) and whether n l=1 X l = 1. If any of these tests fails, then player U i halts and sets acc i = false. Otherwise, each player
. . , n and T = T 1 . . . T n and then signs it using sk i to obtain σ i . Finally, each player U i broadcasts σ i .
Finalization.
, and the session key SK = UH ′ (MSK ). Each player U i also sets the session identifier sid i to T .
Correctness and Security
Correctness. In an honest execution of the protocol, it is easy to verify that all participants in the protocol will terminate by accepting and computing the same values for the partner identifier, session identifiers, and the session key. The session key in this case is equal to n j=1 Hash(hk j , c j+1 ,
Security. As the following theorem shows, the GPAKE protocol described above and in Fig. 1 is a secure password-based authenticated group key exchange protocol as long as the primitives on which the protocol is based meet the appropriate security notion described in the theorem.
Theorem 1 Let LPKE be a labeled encryption secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks, let HASH be a family of smooth projective hash functions, let UH and UH ′ be families of universal hash functions, and let SIG be a signature scheme that is unforgeable against chosen-message attacks. Let GPAKE denote the protocol built from these primitives as described above and let A be an adversary against GPAKE. Then, the advantage function Adv ake-ind GPAKE ,A (k) is only negligibly larger than O(q/N ), where q denotes the maximum number of different protocol instances to which A has asked Send queries and N is the dictionary size.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix A. In it, we actually show that the security of our protocol is only negligibly larger than (q send-1 + q send-2 )/N , where q send-1 and q send-2 represent the maximum number of Send queries that the adversary can ask with respect to the first and second round of communication and N is dictionary size. Even though we believe this security level is good enough for groups of small to medium sizes, it may not be sufficient in cases where the number of users in a group is large and the dictionary size is small. In the latter case, it would be desirable to have a scheme whose security is only negligibly larger than the number of sessions (and not protocol instances) over the size of the dictionary. Unfortunately, the latter cannot be achieved by our protocol as it is possible for an active adversary to test in the same session a number of passwords that is linear in the total number of users, for instance by playing the role of every other user.
Efficiency
Our protocol is quite efficient, only requiring a small amount of computation by each user. In what concerns encryption and hash computations, each user only has to perform 2 encryptions, 3 projection key generations, 3 hash computations, 3 projected hash computations, and 5 universal hash computations. The most expensive part of our protocol, which is linear in the group size, is the number of signature verifications and the master session key computation. While the latter computation can be improved by using algorithms for multi-exponentiations, the former can be improved by using two-time signature schemes.
It is worth mentioning here that, as done by Katz et al. [26] in the case of the KOY protocol [27] , one could also improve the efficiency of our protocol by using two different encryption schemes in the computation of the ciphertexts c R i and c L i broadcasted in the first and second rounds. While the computation of the ciphertexts c R i would require a CCA-secure labeled encryption scheme, the computation of the ciphertexts c L i would only require a CPA-secure encryption scheme. To show that this would actually be the case, one would need to modify the proofs of lemmas 10 and 14 in Appendix A. In the case of the proof of Lemma 10 (which would rely on the CPA-secure encryption scheme), the decryption oracle can be avoided by using the secret key for the CCA-secure labeled encryption scheme to check the validity of a ciphertext c R i . In the case of the proof of Lemma 14 (which would rely on the CCA-secure labeled encryption scheme), one would only need the decryption oracle to check the validity of a ciphertext c R i , since the validity of a ciphertext c L i would be checked using the secret key for the CPA-secure encryption scheme.
Future Work
One issue not addressed in the current paper is whether our protocol remains secure in the presence of Corrupt queries, through which the adversary can learn the values of the long-term secret keys held by a user. Fig. 1 . An honest execution of the password-authenticated group key exchange protocol by player U i in a group {U 1 , . . . , U n }, where 
A Proof of Theorem 1
Notation. Before proceeding with the proof of Theorem 1, we define some basic notation and terminology that will be used in the proof. We start by classifying the Send queries into 6 categories, depending on the stage of the protocol to which the query is associated.
-Send 0 . This query has the form (U j i , {U 1 , . . . , U n }) and denotes the initial Send query made to user instance U j i when executing the protocol in a group G = {U 1 , . . . , U n } that contains user U i . The output of this query is the pair (l i , c R i ) that user instance U j i generates in the first round of communication.
-Send 1 . This query has the form (U j i , {(l 1 , c R 1 ), . . . , (l n , c R n )}, {U 1 , . . . , U n }) and denotes the second Send query to user instance U j i . It returns the tuple (phk
This query has the form (U
. . , U n }) and denotes the third Send query to user instance U j i . It returns the tuple (phk i , phk
. . , U n }) denotes the fourth Send query to user instance
. . , U n }) denotes the fifth Send query to user instance U j i . It returns the signature σ i that instance
This denotes the last Send query to user instance U We say a message is t-oracle-generated if that message has been generated by an oracle in round t of some session. We say that a ciphertext-label pair (c R ,
if c R is a valid encryption of the password pw G with respect to the public key pk and the label l, and pid
Proof of Theorem 1. Let A be an adversary against our password-based group key exchange protocol GPAKE. The goal of proof is to show that the advantage of A in breaking the semantic security of GPAKE is only negligibly better than q send-1 +q send-2 over the size of the dictionary. To do so, our proof uses a sequence of hybrid experiments, the first of which corresponds to the actual attack. For each hybrid experiment Hyb n , we define an event Succ n corresponding to the case in which the adversary A correctly guesses the bit b involved in the Test query. Likewise, we also define the corresponding advantage of the adversary A in each of these experiments to be Adv ake-ind
Hybrid experiment Hyb 0 . This first experiment corresponds to a real attack, in which all the parameters, such as the public parameters in the common reference string and the passwords associated with each group of users, are chosen as in the actual scheme. By definition, the advantage of an adversary A in guessing the bit b involved in the Test query in this experiment is exactly the same as in the real attack.
Adv
Hybrid experiment Hyb 1 . In this experiment, we change the simulation of the Execute oracle so that the values K i , K L i , and K R i for i = 1, . . . , n are chosen uniformly at random from G, where n is the size of the group G. As the lemma below shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter. This is due to pseudorandomness property of the smooth projective hash function.
Lemma 2 Adv
Proof. To prove this lemma, we show how to construct an adversary D against the pseudorandomness property of the smooth projective hash function from an adversary A capable of distinguishing the current experiment from the previous one.
To do so, we recall that the adversary D is given a public key pk for a labeled encryption scheme and access to two oracles: Enc(·, ·) and Hash(·, ·, ·). The oracle Enc(·, ·) receives as input a message m and a label l and outputs a ciphertext c, which is an encryption of message m with respect to the public key pk and the label l. The oracle Hash(·, ·, ·) receives as input a label l, a message m, and a ciphertext c. If the ciphertext c is not the result of a previous query (l, m) to the oracle Enc, then it outputs ⊥. Otherwise, the oracle Hash computes a hash key hk via hk (k) with non-negligible probability.
We construct an adversary D as follows. First, D uses pk to initialize the common reference string exactly as in the experiment Hyb 0 . Then, whenever A asks a Send or Execute query with respect to a group G for which no password has been defined, then D chooses a password pw G for that group uniformly at random from the dictionary Dict. Then, D continues to simulate all of A's oracles exactly as in experiment Hyb 0 except when computing the values 
Next, D queries its oracle Hash three times for each i in {1, . . . , |G|} on inputs Hybrid experiment Hyb 2 . In this experiment, we change again the simulation of the Execute oracle so that the master key MSK i computed by each player in an Execute query is chosen uniformly at random from the group G. As the lemma below shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter. The arguments used to prove this lemma are in fact information theoretic.
Lemma 3 Adv
Proof. The proof of Lemma 3 uses an argument similar to the one used by Katz and Yung in their proof of Burmester-Desmedt protocol [29] . First, we note that in the simulation of Execute oracle in experiment Hyb 1 , the values K i for i = 1, . . . , |G| are all chosen at random in G. Second, let g denote a generator for G. We note that, from the transcript T that the adversary receives as output for an Execute query, the values K i are constrained by the following |G| equations.
Of these equations, only |G| − 1 are linearly independent. Finally, the master key computed by the players defines an additional equation
Since the last equation is linearly independent of the previous ones, the master secret key MSK i that each player in the group G computes in an Execute query is independent of the transcript T that the adversary A sees. Thus, no computationally unbounded adversary A can tell experiment Hyb 2 apart from Hyb 1 . As a result, for any A, Adv
Hybrid experiment Hyb 3 . In this experiment, we change once more the simulation of the Execute oracle so that the session key SK i computed by each player in an Execute query is chosen uniformly at random in {0, 1} l . As the lemma below shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter. The proof of Lemma 4 follows easily from the properties of the family of universal hash functions UH ′ , which guarantees that its output is statistically close to uniform in {0, 1} l when given a random value in G as input.
Lemma 4 Adv
Hybrid experiment Hyb 4 . In this experiment, we change one last time the simulation of the Execute oracle so that the password pw G associated with a group G is no longer used. More specifically, when simulating an Execute query, the ciphertexts c R i and c L i that each player U i ∈ G computes becomes the encryption of a dummy password pw ′ G = pw G . As the lemma below shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter. The proof of Lemma 5 follows from the semantic security of the labeled encryption scheme
LPKE.
Lemma 5 Adv
Proof. To prove this lemma, we show how to construct an adversary D against the chosen-ciphertext indistinguishability of LPKE from an adversary A capable of distinguishing the current experiment from the previous one. We recall that the adversary D is given a public key pk for the labeled encryption scheme and access to two oracles: the Left-or-Right encryption oracle Enc(·, ·, ·) and a decryption oracle Dec(·, ·). The latter, however, is not needed in this part of the proof.
We construct an adversary D as follows. First, D uses pk to initialize the common reference string exactly as in the experiment Hyb 3 . Then, whenever A asks a Send or Execute query with respect to a group G for which no password has been defined, then D first chooses a password pw G for that group uniformly at random from the dictionary Dict. Thus, the proof of Lemma 5 follows from the chosen-ciphertext indistinguishability of LPKE.
Hybrid experiment Hyb 5 . In this new experiment, we change the simulation of the Send oracle of an instance U j i whenever the latter receives an 1-oracle-generated ciphertext c R i−1 (the one that should have been created by its predecessor) in Send 1 query. Let U
are also chosen uniformly at random. As the lemma below shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter. The proof of Lemma 6 follows from the security properties of the smooth projective hash function family HASH .
Lemma 6 Adv
Proof. The proof of Lemma 6 has two cases depending on whether or not the 1-oracle-generated ciphertext c R i−1 is valid for U 
The proof in this case follows easily from the smoothness property of the family of smooth projective hash functions, which says that if c R i−1 is not a valid encryption of the password pw G with respect to the public-key pk and label l i−1 , then the hash value
used to check the test session key of its predecessor is also statistically close to uniform in G. As a result, except with negligible probability, the instance U j i will halt and reject (by setting acc j i = false) after receiving the test value test R i−1 . Hence, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one due to this case is a negligible function of the security parameter.
The proof of this case follows from pseudorandomness property of the family of smooth projective hash functions. To prove so, we show how to construct an adversary D against the pseudorandomness property of the family HASH from an adversary A capable of distinguishing the current experiment from the previous one when c R i−1 is valid for U j i . We construct an adversary D as follows. First, D uses pk to initialize the common reference string exactly as in the experiment Hyb 4 . Then, whenever A asks a Send or Execute query with respect to a group G for which no password has been defined, then D chooses a password pw G for that group uniformly at random from the dictionary Dict. Then, D continues to simulate all of A's oracles exactly as in experiment Hyb 4 except when an instance U rejects with overwhelming probability due to the security of the signature scheme SIG. This is because the case we are considering is the one in which the ciphertext c R i−1 is 1-oracle-generated and valid for U j i . Thus, the only way for A to send projections keys phk (k). Hence, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one due to this case is a negligible function of the security parameter.
Since in both cases, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter, the proof of Lemma 6 follows.
Hybrid experiment Hyb 6 . In this new experiment, we change once again the simulation of the Send oracle of an instance U j i whenever the latter receives an 1-oracle-generated ciphertext c R i−1 in a Send 1 query so that U j i computes the ciphertext c L i using a dummy password pw ′ G that is different from the password pw G associated with the group G. As the lemma below shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter. The proof of Lemma 7 follows from the chosen-plaintext security of the labeled encryption scheme LPKE.
Lemma 7 Adv
Proof. The proof of this lemma is similar to that of Lemma 5 and follows easily from the chosenplaintext security of the labeled encryption scheme LPKE. To construct the adversary D for LPKE from an adversary A capable of distinguishing the current experiment from the previous one, we proceed as follows. First, D uses pk to initialize the common reference string exactly as in the experiment Hyb 5 . Then, whenever A asks a Send 0 or Execute query with respect to a group G for which no password has been defined, then D first chooses a password pw G for that group uniformly at random from the dictionary Dict as well as a dummy password pw ′ G = pw G of the appropriate length. also chooses a dummy password pw ′ G = pw G of the appropriate length. Next, D continues to simulate all of A's oracles exactly as in experiment Hyb 5 except when A makes a Send 1 query to an U 
LPKE.
Hybrid experiment Hyb 7 . In this experiment, we change the simulation so that, whenever an instance U j i receives a valid adversarially-generated ciphertext c R i−1 in a Send 1 query, we halt the simulation and consider the adversary A successful. No other change is made to simulation. Clearly, if such ciphertext c R i−1 is never sent by A, then the current and the previous experiments are identical. On the other hand, if the adversary A does happen to send such a valid ciphertext, then A is considered successful. Therefore, as the following lemma states, the advantage of A in the current experiment is greater or equal to that in the previous experiment.
Lemma 8 Adv
Hybrid experiment Hyb 8 . In this experiment, we change the simulation so that, whenever an instance U j i receives a invalid adversarially-generated ciphertext c R i−1 in a Send 1 query, then U j i always chooses the value K L i uniformly at random from G. Moreover, it always halts and rejects (by setting acc j i = false) after receiving a Send 3 query from A. Everything else remains the same. As the following lemma shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter.
Lemma 9 Adv
Proof. The proof of Lemma 9 follows easily from the smoothness property of smooth projective hash function family HASH , which says that if c R i−1 is not a valid encryption of the password pw G with respect to the public-key pk and label l i−1 , then the hash value
Hybrid experiment Hyb 9 . In this experiment, we change once again the simulation of the Send oracle of an instance U j i whenever the latter receives a invalid adversarially-generated ciphertext c R i−1 in a Send 1 query so that the latter computes the ciphertext c L i using dummy password pw ′ G that is different from the pw G associated the group G. Everything else remains the same. As the following lemma shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter. The proof of Lemma 10 follows from the semantic security of the labeled encryption scheme LPKE. 
Proof. The proof of this lemma is similar to that of Lemma 7 and follows easily from the chosenciphertext security of the labeled encryption scheme LPKE. As in that case, we are only able to make this change to the simulation because instance U j i always chooses the value K L i uniformly at random from G and because it always halts and rejects (by setting acc j i = false) after receiving a Send 3 query from D. The only difference between the proof of Lemma 7 and the present one is that here we need to make use of the decryption oracle for LPKE to find out if c R i−1 is a valid encryption of the group password pw G with respect to the public key pk and the label l i−1 . This is because the ciphertext c R i−1 is generated by the adversary in this case. Like in the proof of Lemma 7, the probability that D distinguishes between experiments Exp Hybrid experiment Hyb 10 . In this new experiment, we change the simulation of the Send 2 oracle of an instance U j i so that, whenever the latter receives an 2-oracle-generated ciphertext c L i+1 , the values K i and K R i are chosen uniformly at random from G. As the lemma below shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter. The proof of Lemma 11 is omitted here since it follows easily from the smoothness property of smooth projective hash function family HASH as, since the previous any 2-oracle-generated ciphertext c L i+1 is always an encryption of a dummy password in this case and hence not valid. Hybrid experiment Hyb 11 . In this experiment, we change the simulation of the Send 2 oracle of an instance U j i so that, whenever an instance U j i receives a valid adversarially-generated ciphertext c L i+1 in a Send 2 query, we halt the simulation and consider the adversary A successful. No other change is made to simulation. Clearly, if such ciphertext c L i+1 is never sent by A, then the current and the previous experiments are identical. On the other hand, if the adversary A does happen to send such a valid ciphertext, then A is considered successful. Therefore, as the following lemma states, the advantage of A in the current experiment is greater or equal to that in the previous experiment. Hybrid experiment Hyb 12 . In this experiment, we change once again the simulation of the Send 2 oracle of an instance U j i so that, whenever an instance U j i receives a invalid adversariallygenerated ciphertext c L i+1 in a Send 2 query, then U j i always chooses the values K R i and K i uniformly at random from G. Moreover, it always halts and rejects (by setting acc j i = false) after receiving a Send 4 query from A. Everything else remains the same. As the following lemma shows, the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter. Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 9, Lemma 13 follows easily from the smoothness property of smooth projective hash function family HASH , which says that if c L i+1 is not a valid encryption of the password pw G with respect to the public-key pk and label l i+1 , then the hash values K R i = Hash(hk R i , c L i+1 , l i+1 , pw G ) and K i = Hash(hk i , c L i+1 , l i+1 , pw G ) are statistically close to uniform in G. Likewise, the master is straight-forward and omitted here). This holds because the signature of a user always guarantees the validity of the verification keys associated with his successor and predecessor. Thus, attacks in which the adversary sends different verification keys to different users will always cause at least one of signatures in the ensemble to be invalid. Putting everything together, we can conclude that, whenever an instance U j i accepts, its session partners are in fact oracle instances not played by the adversary and that all keys K t for t = 1, . . . , |G| are random values in G. As a result, the values X t for t = 1, . . . , |G| outputted by the Send 4 oracles define exactly |G| equations, of which |G|−1 are linearly independent, as in the proof of Lemma 3. Since in round 5, each instance broadcasts its own signature of the transcript, it must be the case that, if U j i accepts after a Send 5 query, with high probability it has received the correct values X t computed by each partner instance of U t in that session. If that is not the case, then it is straight-forward to build an adversary capable of breaking the security of the signature scheme SIG. Finally, since the master key computed by instance U j i defines an additional equation, which is linearly independent of the other |G| − 1 equations that were defined by the values X 1 , . . . , X |G| , its value is independent of the transcript T that the adversary A sees. It follows that the difference in the advantage between the current experiment and previous one is a negligible function of the security parameter.
To conclude the proof, we first notice that, since the session keys of all accepting instances are chosen at random and since all session partners that accept end up computing the same session key (due to the security of the signature scheme SIG), the advantage of A in the current experiment is 0 when A does not generate a valid ciphertext round 1 or 2. Second, in the current experiment, all oracle instances are simulated using dummy passwords, A's view of the protocol is independent of the passwords that are chosen for each group of users. Finally, since each ciphertext uniquely defines a password, we have that the probability that any given adversarially generated ciphertext is valid is at most 1/N , where N is the size of the dictionary. As the number of adversarially generated ciphertexts is bounded by q send-1 + q send-2 , the advantage of A in the current experiment is only negligibly larger than (q send-1 + q send-2 )/N . By combining all the lemmas above, one easily obtains the announced result in Theorem 1.
Lemma 16 Adv
